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In the face of high energy prices and concerns
about global warming, environmentalists and
planners offer high-speed rail as an environmen-
tally friendly alternative to driving and air travel.
California, Florida, the Midwest, and other parts
of the country are actively considering specific
high-speed rail plans.
Close scrutiny of these plans reveals that they
do not live up to the hype. As attractive as 110- to
220-mile-per-hour trains might sound, even the
most optimistic forecasts predict they will take
few cars off the road. At best, theywill replace for-
profit private commuter airlines with heavily
subsidized public rail systems that are likely to
require continued subsidies far into the future.
Nor are high-speed rail lines particularly envi-
ronmentally friendly. Planners have predicted that
a proposed line in Florida would use more energy
and emit more of some pollutants than all of the
cars it would take off the road. California planners
forecast that high-speed rail would reduce pollu-
tionandgreenhousegas emissionsbyamere0.7 to
1.5 percent—but only if ridership reached the high
end of projected levels. Lower ridershipwould nul-
lify energy savings and pollution reductions.
These assessments are confirmed by the actual
experience of high-speed rail lines in Japan and
Europe. Since Japan introduced high-speed bullet
trains, passenger rail has lost more than half its
market share to the automobile. Since Italy,
France, and other European countries opened
their high-speed rail lines, rail’s market share in
Europe has dwindled from 8.2 to 5.8 percent of
travel. If high-speed rail doesn’t work in Japan and
Europe, how can it work in the United States?
Asmegaprojects—theCalifornia high-speed rail
is projected to cost $33 to $37 billion—high-speed
rail plans pose serious risks for taxpayers. Costs of
recent rail projects in Denver and Seattle are run-
ning 60 to 100 percent above projections. Once
construction begins, politicians will feel obligated
to throw good taxpayers’ money after bad. Once
projects are completed,most plans call for them to
be turned over to private companies that will keep
anyoperationalprofits,while taxpayerswill remain
vulnerable if the trains losemoney.
In short, high-speed rail proposals are high-
cost, high-risk megaprojects that promise little
or no congestion relief, energy savings, or other
environmental benefits. Taxpayers and politi-
cians should be wary of any transportation pro-
jects that cannot be paid for out of user fees.
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Introduction
Imagine walking a few blocks from your
downtown San Francisco office and board-
ing a sleek, electrically powered train. Within
a few moments, your train departs, on time,
whisking you and hundreds of other passen-
gers away at more than 200 miles per hour.
On board, you can have a drink in the bar
car, chatwithother passengers, or plug in your
laptop and wirelessly surf the web. In barely
more than two-and-a-half hours, after a jour-
ney of nearly 400 miles, you can disembark
from the train in downtown Los Angeles.
This attractive fantasy is the picture that
high-speed rail advocates want you to have in
mind when you consider their proposals in
California, Florida, the Midwest, and many
other parts of the country. Viewed from a
slightly different perspective, however, and fan-
tasy looksmore like a nightmare.
Imagine spending $25 billion of public
money building a high-speed rail line—not
counting the interest on bonded debt or cost
overruns, which together will quite probably
double the cost to the public. When the line is
completed, it is turned over to a private com-
pany that put up a relatively small amount of
money—say, $5 billion. If they can run it at a
profit, they get all the profits. If they losemon-
ey, it will be up to the public to make up the
difference so as not to waste the initial $25 (or
$50) billion expense.
Taxeswill be diverted topayoff thedebt for
some 30 years, after which the taxpayer might
seem to be off the hook. But one of the dirty
little secrets of passenger rail transportation is
thatmost of the infrastructure—the trains, the
rails, the electrical facilities, and the stations—
must be completely replaced, rebuilt, or reha-
bilitated every 30 years. Of course, the private
company running the trains won’t have the
money to do that, so it will be up to the public
to find the money or suffer complaints about
delayed trains and other mishaps.
Contrary to the apparent attraction of fast
downtown-to-downtown travel times, the
truth is that few people live or work in down-
towns anymore. As a result, even a 200-mile-
per-hour train won’t take more than 3 or 4
percent of cars off the highways it parallels.
Instead, the main effect of this heavily subsi-
dized train will be to put struggling (and rel-
atively unsubsidized) short-haul airlines out
of business.
Although the electrically powered train
might be somewhatmore energy-efficient and
(if the electricity does not come from fossil
fuels) less polluting than airplanes, the energy
and pollution cost of constructing the rail line
(which will require huge amounts of fossil
fuels) will be so great that it will take decades
of operational savings to pay back that cost.
And, soon after those decades are finally up, it
will be time to completely rebuild the line—at
a high energy as well as fiscal cost.
In short, high-speed rail will require a huge
amount of public money to build. The deci-
sion to build carries a huge risk both that the
ultimate cost will be much greater than pre-
dicted, and that the ridership and other bene-
fits will be lower—especially since the consult-
ing firms hired to forecast those benefits
expect to profit from rail construction. Once
built, the environmental benefits will be
miniscule and themain effectwill be to reduce
the availability of private, relatively unsubsi-
dizedmodes of transportation.
From this perspective, high-speed trains
look a lot less attractive than the architects’
drawings featured on every rail brochure. The
tens of billions of dollars that will be required
to build all of the proposed high-speed rail
lines in the United States could be much
more effectively spent on things like schools,
New Orleans levees, paying down the nation-
al debt, or—perhaps best of all—left in the tax-
payers’ pockets.
The Status of
U.S. High-Speed Rail
Amtrak runs its Acela trains at speedsup to
135 miles per hour in the northeast corridor
between New York City andWashington, DC.
In one 35-mile stretch between New York and
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Boston they speed up to 150 miles per hour.1
Segments of Amtrak’s Southwest Chief, between
Chicago and Los Angeles, and its Surfliners,
between Los Angeles and San Diego, reach
speeds of 90miles per hour.
Otherwise, the maximum speed for pas-
senger trains throughout the United States is
79 miles per hour—and then only on routes
with proper train control systems and whose
grade crossings are fully protected by cross-
ing signals and gates. Without these features,
the maximum speed is no more than 59
miles per hour.
Rail advocates point to the much higher
speeds attained by trains in other nations as
evidence that the United States is “behind the
times.” The train between Beijing and Tianjin,
China, reaches speeds of nearly 220 miles per
hour.2 Starting in 2011, Japanplans to operate
trains as fast as 200 miles per hour.3 Trains in
Francego faster than185milesperhour,while
trains in Germany and Britain are nearly that
fast.4
The Federal Railroad Administration sets
national standards for regulating the maxi-
mum speeds on all rail lines in the nation
according to the quality of the track and the
sophistication of the train signaling systems.
To go at successively higher speeds, rails must
bemaintained to increasingly strict standards.5
Most rail lines have signals that inform
train crews if there are other trains ahead of
them. Passenger trains on lines that have no
signals are limited to 59 miles per hour. With
signals, trains can go 79miles per hour. Trains
can only go faster if the railroad has installed
automatic systems that will stop the train
when necessary—even if the crew fails to stop
the train.6
FRA rules also limit speeds based on grade
crossings. For trains to go up to 110miles per
hour, crossings must have signals and gates.
From110 to 125miles per hour, crossings are
only allowed if they include an “impenetrable
barrier” when trains approach. Above 125
miles per hour, no crossings are allowed.7
In 1991, Congress asked the FRA to desig-
nate up to five high-speed rail corridors,
expanded to eleven in 1998.8 These corridors
are eligible for federal funding for planning
and improvements such as the installation of
grade crossing signals and guards, though the
$30 million available for such grants in 2008
will not go very far.9 The 11 “corridors”—one
of which looks more like a spider web than a
corridor—total more than 9,000 miles in
length (Table 1).
In most of these corridors, the FRA has set
a target top speedof 110miles per hour.While
this is more than the 59- to 79-mile-per-hour
current limit inmost corridors, high-speed rail
aficionados do not consider 110 miles per
hour, or even 125 miles per hour, to be true
“high-speed rail.” The California legislature
has defined high-speed rail as rail lineswith a top
speed greater than 125 miles per hour. “The
reason for the 125 miles per hour threshold,”
says the California Senate Transportation
Committee, “is that existing passenger rail
equipment can operate at this speed if the
appropriate signaling technology is installed
and the right-of-way meets a variety of design
and safety standards.”10
The problemwith increasing existing track
speeds from 79 to 110miles per hour ormore
is that the rails in nearly all of these corridors
areprivatelyownedby freight railroads suchas
BNSF, CSX, Norfolk Southern, and Union
Pacific.Nominally, the railroadswouldbenefit
from such improvements, but since their
freight trains would rarely need to go more
than 79 miles per hour—60 is more typical—
they see no reason to help pay for the expen-
sive signaling and trackmaintenance required
for thehigher speeds.Moreover, a rail line run-
ning both 110-mile-per-hour (or faster) pas-
senger trains and 60-mile-per-hour freight
trains presents major operational problems
that are not welcomed by the freight railroads.
Although the FRA has designated these
corridors, the actual work of planning the
high-speed rail lines is done by the states.
State planners have taken two different
approaches to rail service. In some cases, they
have confined their work to improving grade
crossings and keeping track of the up to 79-
mile-per-hour standards or, in the Midwest,
to boosting speeds on existing tracks to 110
3
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miles per hour. The other approach, taken by
planners in California and Florida, is to plan
an entirely new rail network on which high-
speed passenger trains would operate on sep-
arate tracks from freight trains.
Midwest Rail Initiative
In the late 1930s and early 1940s, steam-
powered trains of the Milwaukee Road regu-
larly operated at speeds of 100 to 110 miles
per hour on portions of their trip between
Chicago and St. Paul.11 The Milwaukee and
its competitors the Chicago & Northwestern
and the Chicago, Burlington & Quincy each
offered at least two trains a day that covered
the length of this journey in six-and-one-half
hours. Today, Amtrak trains take more than
eight hours over the same route. A rail net-
work proposed by theMidwest Regional Rail
Initiative would cut the Chicago-St. Paul trip
times down to five-and-one-half hours.
State departments of transportation in
nine Midwestern states formed the Midwest
Regional Rail Initiative in 1996 in order to
plan several high-speed rail lines. In 2004,
these states published a report proposing a
network of trains operating in eight major
corridors with several branches.
Although the cover of the Midwest rail
report features a photo of an electrically pow-
ered high-speed train in Europe, the report
itself proposes conventional diesel-powered
trains operating at speeds comparable to the
1930sMilwaukeeRoad trains. Specifically, the
report proposed 110-mile-per-hour lines radi-
ating from Chicago to Minneapolis, Green
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Table 1
FRA-Designated High-Speed Rail Corridors
Corridor Endpoint Cities Miles Top Speed
California Sacramento-San Diego 680 ns
Empire New York-Buffalo 439 125
Florida Tampa-Orlando-Miami 356 120
Gulf Coast Houston-Atlanta with 1,022 110
New Orleans-Mobile branch
Keystone Philadelphia-Pittsburgh 349 110
Midwest Chicago-Minneapolis, 1,920 110
Chicago-Detroit,
Chicago-Cleveland,
Chicago-Cincinnati,
Chicago-St. Louis
St. Louis-Kansas City 283 90
Indianapolis-Louisville 111 79
New England Portland-Boston-Montreal 489 110
Northeast Boston-Washington, DC 456 150
Pacific Northwest Eugene-Vancouver, BC 466 110
South Central San Antonio-Tulsa with 994 ns
Dallas-Little Rock branch
Southeast Washington, DC-Atlanta- 874 110
Macon with Richmond-Hampton
Roads branch
Source: “High-Speed Rail Corridor Designations,” Federal Railroad Administration, 2005, tinyurl.com/6s94zd.
Note: ns = not specified.
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Bay, Detroit, Cleveland, Cincinnati, and St.
Louis; 90-mile-per-hour lines fromChicago to
Carbondale andQuincy and fromSt. Louis to
KansasCity; and79-mile-per-hourbranches to
Port Huron, Grand Rapids/Holland, and
Omaha.12
The report estimated that it would cost
about $6.6 billion, or $2.1 million per mile, to
upgradeabout3,150milesof track to the above
speedstandards.About$1.1billionmorewould
be used to purchase 63 train sets that would
cost between $450 and$500millionper year to
operate.13
With stops, the proposal called for run-
ning trains an average of about 74 miles per
hour, or about 40 to 45 percent faster than
current Amtrak speeds.14 The plan also called
for increasing the number of trains per day
on all routes by three to six times.15
In return for this $7.7 billion investment,
the report projects that the Midwest rail sys-
tem would carry about 13.6 million passen-
gers per year, or about four times what the
existing passenger rail system would carry.
The proposal also called for feeder buses
that would connect such places as Staples,
Minnesota; Sioux City, South Dakota; and
Louisville, Kentucky to the rail system, the
goal being to have 90 percent of theMidwest’s
population within an hour of a rail station or
a half hour of a feeder bus station.16 However,
the report did not estimate the costs of this
bus service.
Although the proposal calls for charging
fares of about 50 percent more than Amtrak’s
fares, it projects that many of the routes will
not be able to cover their operational expenses
until 2025.The reportproposes to cover initial
operating losses with a 35-year federal loan
that would be repaid out of operating sur-
pluses after 2025.17 The initial capital costs
would have to be covered by federal and state
funds with no expectation that they would
ever be repaid out of passenger fares.18
Unlike the Florida and California plans
reviewed below, the Midwest plan is not
accompanied by a detailed environmental
analysis, so it is hard to state whether or not
the benefits of the rail lines justify the costs.
It is worth noting that Amtrak carries only a
tiny share of travel in these corridors, so a
quadrupling of Amtrak’s numbers will do lit-
tle to reduce driving or congestion.
For example, in 2007 Amtrak carried few-
er than 450,000 passengers on its trains in
the Chicago-Detroit-Port Huron corridor
(not all of whom went the entire distance).19
By comparison, theMichiganDepartment of
Transportation recorded 9 million vehicles
on the least-used segment of Interstate 94—
which parallels the Amtrak route—and four
to six times thatmany vehicles onmore heav-
ily used segments.20 In the unlikely event that
every rail rider would otherwise have gone by
auto over the least-used segment of the route,
a quadrupling of rail ridership would take
only 9 percent of cars off of this segment.
Just how cost-effective is the Midwest rail
proposal? The total cost of $7.7 billion (includ-
ing trains) averages about $2.4millionpermile
of track. By coincidence, this is approximately
the cost per lane mile of building rural free-
ways. For example, the Ft. Bend (Texas)
Tollroad Authority recently completed a 6.2-
mile four-lane highway, including on- and off-
ramps, overpasses, and underpasses, for $60
million, or about 2.4million per lanemile.21
The average Midwest corridor is about
350miles, so it is generous to assume that the
average trip will be about 300 miles long. If
there are 13.5 million trips per year, that’s
about 4 billion passenger miles over 3,150
miles of track. That represents about 1.3 mil-
lion passenger miles per mile of track each
year, or about $1.85 of capital investment per
annual passenger mile.
By comparison, the average rural interstate
freeway inIowa, Illinois, Indiana,Michigan,Min-
nesota, Missouri, Ohio, and Wisconsin moved
3.5millionpeopleper lanemile in2006,orabout
$0.68ofcapital investmentperannualpassenger
mile.22Thatmakeshighwayconstructionalmost
three timesascosteffectiveas rail improvements.
Inaddition,properly tolledhighways canpay for
themselves, while the Midwest rail initiative
requires billions in subsidies, making new high-
waysmuchmore cost effective, froma taxpayer’s
point of view, than rail lines.
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The Florida High-Speed
Rail Proposal
Florida voters passed an amendment to
the state’s constitution in 2000 mandating
the construction of a high-speed rail system
capable of running trains faster than 120
miles per hour. In response, the Florida legis-
lature created aHigh-Speed Rail Authority in
2002. However, the 2000 ballot measure pro-
vided no funding for the system, and when
voters realized how expensive it might be,
they repealed the measure in 2004.23
Despite the 2004 vote, the state high-speed
rail authority continued to plan for an initial
92-mile rail line betweenOrlando and Tampa.
A 2005 environmental impact statement (EIS)
estimated that this line would cost between
$2.0 and $2.5 billion, or about $22 to $27mil-
lion permile.24 The line was projected to carry
about 4 million passengers a year. In the
unlikely event that all 4millionwent the entire
92-mile route, the line would carry about 368
millionpassengermiles a year. That represents
a minimum capital investment of $5.40 per
annual passenger mile.
The EIS considered several different routes
and twodifferent rail technologies: electric and
gas/turbine. Electric trains could achievemaxi-
mum speeds of 160 miles per hour, while gas/
turbine could only reach 125 miles per hour.
Because of intermediate stops, the electric
trains would only be five minutes faster (55 vs.
60minutes) thangas turbine.25Thegas turbine
also cost less, so the state high-speed rail
authority selected it as the preferred alterna-
tive.26 The authority expected to contract out
actual operation of the rail line to a company
like Virgin Trains, a part of Richard Branson’s
Virgin business group, which operates passen-
ger trains in England and Scotland.27
Planners estimated that the rail line would
divert 11 percent of people who would other-
wise drive between Orlando and Tampa.28
Since most of the traffic on Interstate 4
between the two cities has other origins or des-
tinations, the trainwould removeonly about2
percent of cars from the least-busy segment of
I-4, and smaller shares frombusier segments.29
Traffic on I-4 is growing by more than 2 per-
cent per year, so the rail line would provide, at
most, about one year’s worth of traffic relief.
As the EIS itself noted, the traffic “reduction
would not be sufficient to significantly
improve the LOS [levels of service] on I-4, as
many segments of the roadway would still be
over capacity.”30
The EIS also estimated that either the elec-
tric or turbine trains would produce more
nitrogen oxide pollution than the cars they
would take off the road. The gas turbine trains
in the preferred alternative would also pro-
duce more volatile organic compounds than
the cars they would take off the road.31
Further, planners calculated that operating
and maintaining gas turbine trains would
consume six times more energy, while main-
taining electric trains would consume three-
and-a-half times more energy, than would be
saved if the cars were taken off the road.32 The
EISdidnot estimate the effectsof the trainson
greenhouse gas production. Since greenhouse
gas emissions from fossil fuels are roughly
proportional to energy consumption, and
Florida gets more than 80 percent of its elec-
tricity from fossil fuels, either the turbine or
electricallypowered rail linewouldproduce far
more greenhouse gases than the cars it would
take off the road.
The EIS concluded that “the environmen-
tally preferred alternative is the No Build
Alternative” because it “would result in less
direct and indirect impact to the environ-
ment.”33 The statehigh-speed rail authorityhas
disbanded and the project is now mainly pro-
moted by the Florida Transportation Associ-
ation, which seems to be a consortium of con-
sultants (such as Wilbur Smith Associates),
contractors, and manufacturers (including
Fluor and Bombardier) that would profit from
rail construction.34
California High-Speed Rail
The California high-speed rail proposal is
the most ambitious government-endorsed
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plan in the United States. Not content with
either the FRA’s 110-mile-per-hour plan or
Florida’s 125-mile-per-hour turbine trains,
California isproposing220-mile-per-hour elec-
tric trains, with service extending roughly 700
miles from Sacramento and San Francisco to
SanDiego.
The California legislature created a high-
speed rail authority in 1996, and that author-
ity published what it called a business plan in
2000, followed by an environmental impact
statement in 2005. It has since published a
more specific EIS for the San Francisco Bay
Area segment of the line in 2008. To date, the
authority has spent nearly $58 million plan-
ning the project.35
The 2005 EIS estimated that “the costs
could range from$33 to $37 billion,” or about
$47 to $52million permile.36 That is twice the
per-mile cost of theFloridaplanbecauseof the
higher speeds, the electrical infrastructure,
and California’s moremountainous terrain.
The business plan projects that passenger
revenues will cover operating costs with
enough left over to repay a small portion of
the capital costs. The authority initially pro-
posed to pay for the remaining capital costs
with a quarter-cent sales tax.37 But the Cali-
fornia constitution requires a two-thirds
supermajority to impose tax increases, and few
thought thiswouldbepossible. So the author-
ity’s current plan calls for a combination of
federal, state, local, and private funds.
In 2004, the authority proposed to ask
voters to approve the sale of nearly $10 bil-
lion in general obligation bonds to fund part
of the project. Due to the state’s budget prob-
lems, this vote was postponed to 2006, and
then to 2008. California’s budgetary prob-
lems are far from solved, but high-speed rail
is on the ballot in November, 2008.38
Even if voters approve these bonds, com-
pletion of the high-speed rail depends on get-
ting additional funds from the federal gov-
ernment, private investors, and other sources.
The federal government has its own deficits
to deal with, and Congress does not have any
sort of high-speed rail fund. Yet the authori-
ty hopes Congress will match or even slightly
exceed the state’s investment in high-speed
rail.
Private funds are even more uncertain.
The authority hopes it can entice investors
into providing $5 to $7.5 billion—slightly
more than half the federal and state shares—
in exchange for a contract to operate the rail
system that would allow the private investors
to keep all operating revenues.39 This is a
“public-private partnership” in the sense that
the public puts up most of the money and
the private partners get all of the operating
profits. Of course, the private investors risk
losing their share of the capital cost, but once
built, if the rail lines end up losing money,
the state is likely to feel obligated to cover the
operating losses.
In terms of cost effectiveness, theCalifornia
high-speed rail system is estimated to carry
about14.4billionpassengermilesper year.40At
a minimum of $33 billion in capital invest-
ment, that represents about $2.30 of invest-
ment per annual passenger mile—well over
three times the cost of rural freeway lanes.
One cost that is rarely, if ever,mentioned by
promoters of passenger rail transportation is
that of reconstructing and rehabilitating rail
lines, which is needed about every 30 years.
This cost has come to haunt the transit agen-
cies that operate older urban rail systems
throughout the country. In 2002, the Wash-
ington Metropolitan Area Transit Authority
(WMATA) estimated that it needed $12.2 bil-
lion—roughly the original cost of constructing
Washington’s Metrorail system—to rehabili-
tate the system.41 There is no money available
to do this work, with the result that the system
is experiencing frequent breakdowns and ser-
vice delays.42
Rail transit systems in Chicago, New York,
and San Francisco also face fiscal crises. The
Chicago Transit Authority is reputedly “on the
vergeof collapse,” as it needs$16billion it does-
n’t have in order to rehabilitate its tracks and
trains.43 New York’s Metropolitan Transpor-
tationAuthorityhasa$17billionshortfall in its
funding for rail rehabilitation.44 Similarly, the
San Francisco BART system faces a $5.8 billion
shortfall to replace worn-out equipment.45
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California’s business plan andEIS are char-
acteristically silent on the question ofwhowill
pay for future rehabilitation costs: the public
or the private investors that have (presumably)
profited from the lines. In fact, neither plan
even mentions that anyone will ever have to
pay such costs—as far as readers can tell, once
built, the rail lines and trains will last forever.
The 2005 EIS describes the benefits that
federal and state taxpayers can expect from
the $25 billion or more they will be asked to
pay for building this project. First, high-
speed rail will take an average of 3.8 percent
of cars off of the California highways that
parallel the rail routes.46 This means high-
speed rail will do little to relieve highway con-
gestion. If high-speed rail is not built, the EIS
projects that 45 segments of major highways
along the rail routes will be regularly con-
gested to “level of service F” (meaning stop-
and-go traffic); building rail will still leave 41
of those segments at level of service F.47
For comparison purposes, the EIS includes
an alternative that concentrates on building
morehighwaysandexpandingairports instead
of high-speed rail. This alternative, the author-
ity notes, would costmore than twice asmuch
as building high-speed rail.48 But it also does
more than five times as much to relieve traffic
congestion as the rail alternative: while the rail
alternative reduces congestion by 3.8 percent,
the highway-air alternative reduces congestion
by 20.6 percent.49
The EIS’s alternative plan is really a straw
man. It is designed to be unpopular due to its
expense, but the alternative does not provide
either a fair or realistic comparison. To be fair,
the authority couldhavedeveloped ahighway-
air alternative that cost the same ashigh-speed
rail to see how cost-effective rail is in compari-
son with highway and air improvements. To
be realistic, the EIS should have recognized
that, even if high-speed rail is built, California
will still need to spend tens of billions of dol-
lars to relieve highway congestion.
While high-speed rail does little to reduce
highway traffic, it decimates California’s in-
state airline service. The EIS projects that,
under its high-end rail ridership projections,
in-state air travelwoulddeclineby two-thirds.50
The EIS says that the rail service would have
only minor effects on connecting air travel—
people flying in and out of California and con-
necting toor froma local in-statedestination—
but the airlines may not consider such service
to be economically viable after losing two-
thirds of their local customers.
High-speed rail has a negligible effect on
energy consumption. The EIS estimates that
construction of the high-speed rail lines will
consumemore than150 trillionBTUsof ener-
gy.51 But the energy saved in operations is sup-
posed to pay back this cost in just five years.52
The EIS’s energy analysis is flawed, how-
ever, by an assumption that autos and air-
planes will be as energy intensive in the
future as they are today.53 In fact, under the
Energy Independence and Security Act of
2007, cars on the road in 2020 will be 21 per-
cent more fuel-efficient than they are today,
and by 2030 they will be 33 percent more
fuel-efficient. If fuel prices remain high, these
projections may end up being conservative.
It is also reasonable to assume that air-
plane manufacturers will respond to high
fuel prices by making planes more energy-
efficient. Boeing, for example, promises that
its 787 plane will be 20 percent more fuel-
efficient than comparable planes are today.54
If autos and airplanes become, over the
life of the high-speed rail project, an average
of 20 percent more fuel-efficient than they
are today, then the payback period for high-
speed rail rises to 25 years. This payback peri-
od also crucially depends on high-speed rail
attracting the high number of riders that the
authority has estimated. If ridership is lower,
the payback period will be longer. And, since
rail lines require expensive and energy-inten-
sive reconstruction and rehabilitation about
every 30 years, it is quite possible that high-
speed rail will save no energy at all.
Steven Polzin, of the University of South
Florida’s Center for Urban Transportation
Research, points out that autos andbuses have
relatively short life cycles, so they can readily
adapt to the need to save energy or reduce pol-
lution. “Modes where the vehicles and guide-
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ways are integrated systems”—meaning rail—
“may be far more difficult or expensive to
upgrade tonewer,moreefficient technologies,”
Polzin adds.55 In other words, while the U.S.
auto fleet completely turns over every 18 years
and so can quickly becomemore fuel-efficient,
builders of rail lines are stuck with whatever
technology they select for decades.
The EIS’s projections of other environmen-
tal benefits of high-speed rail are similarly
problematic. The EIS estimates, for example,
that rail will reduce California’s transporta-
tion-related air pollution, relative to the no-
build alternative, by 0.7 percent (for particu-
lates) to 1.5 percent (for nitrogen oxides), with
otherpollutants inbetween.Unlike energy, this
does take into account improvements inpollu-
tion control technology. For example, the EIS
reported that in 1997, cars, planes, trains, and
electric utilities emitted more than 9,700 met-
ric tons of carbon monoxide. Under the no-
build alternative, the EIS projects that by 2020
the emissions will decline to 3,101metric tons.
High-speed rail would further reduce carbon
monoxide emissions to 3,074metric tons.
Note thatmodest improvements in relative-
ly low-costpollutiontechnologiesareprojected
to reduce carbonmonoxide pollution by near-
ly 70percent, despite the growth inpopulation
and travel. By comparison, at a cost of at least
$33 to $37 billion, high-speed rail reduces car-
bonmonoxide pollutionby amere 0.9 percent.
As a pollution-control device, high-speed rail is
spectacularly cost ineffective.
Similarly, the EIS projects that high-speed
railwould reduce greenhouse gas emissions by
1.4percent. In this case, however, theEIS failed
to account for improvements in auto and air-
plane energy efficiency or for the possibility of
the widespread adoption of electric cars. For
example, by substituting plug-in hybrid elec-
tric cars for some of their regular cars and rely-
ing on electric charges for just 1.5 percent of
their driving, California drivers could reduce
greenhouse gas emissions more than high-
speed rail.
All of thebenefits ofCalifornia’s high-speed
rail plan depend on the rail authority’s opti-
mistic projectionsof 32 to58million ridersper
year in 2020.56 By comparison, Amtrak’s
Boston-to-Washington, DC, corridor, which
hasmore people today than theCalifornia cor-
ridor is projected to house in 2020, carried just
10million riders in 2007.57
The authority’s projection appears highly
unrealistic. On one hand, the California trains
are projected to travel faster than Amtrak’s
trains. But on the other hand,most of the peo-
ple in the California corridor are located at the
ends of the corridor, while the Northeast corri-
dorhas tensofmillionsofpeople living in inter-
mediate metro areas, including Providence,
New York, Philadelphia, and Baltimore. High-
speed rail’s time advantage over air travel is
greatest for shorter trips, so the California cor-
ridor will have difficulty meeting, much less
greatly exceeding, the levels of ridership that are
present in theNortheast corridor.
A more realistic ridership assessment
would probably discourage any private party
from investing in the California project even if
it were promised 100 percent of the profits. In
short, it appears almost certain thatCalifornia
high-speed rail will cost taxpayers tens of bil-
lions of dollars more than was promised and
will produce even fewer benefits than the tiny
amounts of congestion and pollution reduc-
tions projected in the EIS.
If voters approve the high-speed rail bonds
thisNovember, theCaliforniaHighSpeedRail
Authoritymaydecide to start building the line
even without federal or private matching
funds. Unfortunately, the $9 billion in the
bond measure that is dedicated to high-speed
rail is barely enough to build from San
Francisco to San Jose, with a little left over for
right-of-way purchases elsewhere. California
voters will then be confronted with the ques-
tion of whether they are satisfied with only a
50-mile-long high-speed rail line, or if they are
willing to spend another $30 to $50 billion to
complete the system.
High-Speed Rail in Japan
One way to see how well high-speed rail
might work in the United States is to exam-
9
As a pollution-
control device,
high-speed rail is
spectacularly cost
ineffective.
357436_PA625_1stClass:357436_PA625_1stClass  10/24/2008  9:48 AM  Page 9
ine the experiences in other countries. The
natural place to start is Japan, which opened
the world’s first high-speed rail line, the 130-
mile-per-hour Shinkansen (or bullet trains), in
1964. Newer trains go as fast as 185miles per
hour. These trains had a significant impact
on Japan’s national prestige, yet they did lit-
tle to stop the growth of automobile traffic.
In 1950, railroads were practically the only
mechanized way of getting around Japan and
accounted formore than 92 percent of all pas-
senger travel, with most of the rest being bus
travel. By 1960, when construction began on
the Shinkansen, autos still accounted for less
than 5 percent of Japanese travel, whereas rails
made up 77 percent. But auto driving greatly
accelerated after the Shinkansen opened,
whereas the growth in train travel slowed and,
after 1975, leveled off (see Figure 1).58
The state-owned Japanese National Rail-
ways had earned aprofit every year since it had
been formed in 1949. But it went into the red
after the Shinkansen opened. Raising fares to
cover its costs only accelerated the loss in pas-
sengers to highway and air travel. On top of
that, it was pressured by politicians from cities
not on the Shinkansen line to extend high-
speed rail service to their prefectures, which
only added to the company’s debt and annual
losses.59
By 1987, expansion of bullet-train service
had increased Japanese National Railways’
debt to more than $200 billion. Facing a
financial crisis, the government absorbed the
debt and privatized the railway. Today, pri-
vate operators earn a profit running the
Shinkansen and other Japanese trains, but
they do not have to repay the capital costs—
and further capital expansions of high-speed
rail service continue to receive extensive gov-
ernment subsidies.60
Privatization may have boosted ridership
in the late 1980s, but it leveled off again after
1990. Meanwhile, driving continued to grow
rapidly and surpassed rail as the predomi-
nant form of passenger travel around 1977.
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Figure 1
Japanese Passenger Transport
Source: Japan Ministry of Transport.
Note: Auto driving took off in 1965, right after the first Japanese bullet train began operating. When light-motor vehi-
cles are counted, autos today move 60 percent of Japanese passenger travel, whereas trains move only 29 percent.
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Due to a recession and high fuel prices,
auto driving in Japan has declined since
1999. Rail travel made up for only a small
portion of this decline. The rest has been
made up for by the rapid growth in motor-
bikes and light motor vehicles, a special class of
Japanese autoswith engines smaller than 660
cubic centimeters (about 40 cubic inches). In
other words, even in the face of high fuel
prices, the Japanese continue to rely primari-
ly on personal motorized transport rather
than high-speed trains or other forms of
mass transportation.
As of 2007, trains carry 29 percent of pas-
senger travel whereas autos, including light
motor vehicles, carry 60 percent. The remain-
der is about equally divided between bus and
domestic air.
The tracks for Japan’s high-speed trains are
a different width (gauge) than for its conven-
tional trains, so there is no question of high-
speed passenger trains interfering with freight
traffic. Yet rails carry only about 4 percent of
Japanese freight. Highways carry 60 percent
and coastal shipping carries 36 percent.
High-Speed Rail in Europe
Europe’s experiencewith high-speed rail is
even more instructive. Italy introduced the
high-speed train to Europe with its 160-mile-
per-hour Direttissima between Rome and
Florence in 1978. France followed with the
Paris-Lyon train à grande vitesse (TGV) of the
same speed in 1981. Germany and other
countries followed a few years later.
Since then, France has been the European
leaderof thehigh-speed railmovement. French
trains now carry 54 percent of Europe’s high-
speed rail passenger-kilometers, followed by
Germany at 26 percent, and Italy at 10 percent.
No other country carries even 5 percent of
Europe’s high-speed rail travelers.
Today’s French rail lines operate as fast as
185 miles per hour and extend into Belgium,
Germany, Italy, and—throughtheChannel tun-
nel—Great Britain. Other European nations—
including Austria, Finland, Norway, Portugal,
Russia, Spain, and Sweden—have some formof
high-speed rail, thoughmost of these trains are
only in the 125–135mile-per-hour range.
When operating at high speeds, the TGVs
runondedicated tracks. ButTGVs also operate
on conventional tracks at normal speeds. In
fact, while TGVs may be seen throughout
France, they only operate at high speeds be-
tween Paris and a few other cities, including
Marseille, Le Mans, St. Pierre des Corps, Lon-
don, and Brussels. Similarly, Germany’s high-
speed Inter-City Express (ICE) trains operate at
their highest speeds of about 200 miles per
hour only on selected routes, such as Berlin-
Hamburg and Munich-Augsburg, and run at
lowerspeeds (butstill above125milesperhour)
on other routes and at conventional speeds
(below125miles perhour) on still other routes.
While high-speed rail is convenient for
tourists who want to travel through Europe
without the expense of renting a car, it has
done little to change European travel habits.
In1980, intercity rail accounted for8.2percent
of passenger travel in the EU-15 (the 15 coun-
tries that were members of the European
Union as of 2000). By 2000, intercity rail had
declined to 6.3 percent. Auto driving gained
almost exactly the samemarket share that rails
lost in this time period, growing from 76.4 to
78.3 percent. This is a coincidence, as the real
challenge to high-speed rail has come from
low-cost airlines. Thanks to Europe’s “open
skies” policies, domestic air travel increased
from 2.5 percent of travel in 1980 to 5.8 per-
cent in 2000. Intercity buses and urban transit
both lost shares.61
Rail has continued to lose importance since
2000. In the EU-25 (the 25 members in the
EuropeanUnion as of 2005), rail’s share of trav-
el declined from 6.2 percent in 2000 to 5.8 per-
cent in2004,while air’s share increased from7.7
to 8.0 percent and autos’ share (including
motorcycles) increased from 75.5 to 76.0 per-
cent.62 At best, high-speed rail has slowed the
decline of rail’s importance in passenger travel.
Because of the prominence of high-speed
rail in France and Germany, rail has a higher
share of passenger travel in those countries
than in the rest of Europe. But this is at the
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expense of bus travel; the automobile’s share
of travel in both France andGermany is high-
er than in the rest of Europe.63
Rail’s declining importance in Europe has
come about despite onerous taxes on driving
and huge subsidies to rail transportation.
European nations impose 300 to 400 percent
taxes onmotor fuel, andmuch of the revenue
is effectively transferred to rail subsidies.
“Rail isheavily subsidized,” saysUniversityof
PariseconomistRémyPrud’Homme.“Userspay
about half the total cost of providing the ser-
vice.” Prud’Homme estimates that rail service in
the EU-15 receives about 68 billion euros—or
about $100 billion—of subsidies each year.64
Nor has the introduction of new high-
speed rail service helped relieve highway con-
gestion. “Not a single high-speed trackbuilt to
date has had any perceptible impact on the
road traffic carried by parallel motorways,”
says Ari Vatanen, a member of the European
Parliament, in his summary of a 2005 confer-
ence on European transport.65 However, the
introduction of subsidized high-speed rail has
caused some airlines to end service that paral-
lels rail routes.66
Europe’s passenger travel mix is not much
different from that of theUnited States (Table
2). European intercity rail carries a 5.7 percent
larger share of the travel market than Amtrak.
But it is not even clear that this is the result of
the massive subsidies Europe is pouring into
high-speed rail, since this percentage is steadi-
ly declining. European planners predict that
rail and bus’s combined share will continue to
decline between now and 2030.67
On the other hand, Europe’s emphasis on
using rails for moving passengers has had a
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Table 2
Passenger Travel Mix in 2004
EU-25 (%) United States (%)
Air 8.0 10.9
Auto 76.0 85.3
Bus 8.3 3.2
Intercity rail 5.8 0.1
Urban rail 1.2 0.5
Source: National Transportation Statistics (Washington: Bureau of Transportation Statistics, 2008), Table 1-37;
Panorama of Transport (Brussels: European Commission, 2007), p. 102.
Note: Auto includes motorcycles; bus includes both intercity and urban buses.
Table 3
Freight Travel Mix in 2004
EU-25 (%) United States (%)
Air 0.1 0.4
Highway 72.5 28.7
Rail 16.5 36.8
Pipeline 5.5 20.5
Waterway 5.4 13.6
Source: National Transportation Statistics (Washington: Bureau of Transportation Statistics, 2008), Table 1-46b;
Panorama of Transport (Brussels: European Commission, 2007), p. 69.
Note: Water includes inland waterways but not ocean shipping.
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profound effect on the movement of freight.
While a little more than one-fourth of U.S.
freight goes on the highway andmore than a
third goes by rail, nearly three-fourths of
European freight goes on the road and just a
sixth goes by rail (Table 3). Moreover, rail’s
share of freight movement is declining in
Europe, but increasing in the United States.
Rail’s poor performance at carrying freight
in both Japan and Europe suggests that a
country or region can use its rail system for
passenger or freight, but not both. Spending
$100 billion a year on passenger rail might get
a small percentage of cars off the road—but
one possible consequence is to greatly increase
the number of trucks on the road.
High-Speed Risks
Japanese and European cities are much
denser thanAmerican cities, andmost of them
are served bymuch denser transit systems that
rail passengers can rely on when they get to
their destinations. If high-speed rail cannot
capture or evenmaintain rail’s share of passen-
ger travel from the automobile in Europe and
Japan, how can it work in the United States?
High-speed rail must be considered highly
risky.
A recent oversight report on the California
high-speed rail project from that state’s Senate
Transportation Committee pointed to many
specific risks of high-speed rail, including fore-
casting, rights-of-way, and safety risks.68 Unlike
running a bus system or even an airline, build-
ing a rail line requires accurate long-range fore-
casting. Planning and construction can take
many years, and the service life of the rail line is
measured in decades. A seemingly minor fore-
castingerror can turnwhat appears tobeapro-
ductive asset into an expensive white elephant.
The most obvious forecasting issue is cost.
All of the cost estimates for the Midwest,
Florida, andCalifornia rail projects weremade
before 2005. Since then, the prices of steel,
concrete, and energy have risen dramatically.
As a result, it is likely that projected costs need
to be adjusted upwards by 50 percent ormore.
Denver’s 120-mile FasTracks rail project,
which was planned at the same time as the
Florida andCalifornia high-speed rail projects,
is now estimated to cost 68 percentmore than
was projected in 2004.69 This is not unusual:
according to a 2006 study by researchers at
Northeastern University, U.S. rail transit costs
average 40 percent more than their original
approved budgets.70
The other forecasting problem, of course,
has to do with ridership and other benefits.
Danish planning professor Bent Flyvbjerg
notes that U.S. rail projects typically overesti-
mated ridership by an average of 100 per-
cent.71 He also notes that “rail forecasts are
substantiallymore inaccurate and biased than
road forecasts.”72
Some of the questionable assumptions
made in the Florida and California estimates
of future ridership and other benefits include
the following:
1. Cars and planes will not become
more fuel-efficient in the future.
2. Airports will not become more effi-
cient at moving people.
3. Cars that use alternative fuels will
not become feasible or popular.
4. Downtowns will remain or be re-
stored as preeminent job centers.
5. No new technologies will help re-
duce highway congestion.
6. People will want to go where the
trains go.
Assumptions 1 and 4 are clearly wrong: as
previously noted, cars are likely to be at least
33 percent more fuel-efficient by 2030, and
downtowns have been losing their impor-
tance as job centers since at least 1950. Many
of the other assumptions are also likely to be
wrong. Any forecasts of high-speed rail rider-
ship, energy savings, and other benefits based
on these assumptions are likely to be greatly
overestimated.
The last assumption—that people will want
togowhere the trainsgo—maybe the riskiestof
all. While many people travel between, say, San
Francisco and Los Angeles, that does notmean
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that they travel from downtown to downtown,
which will be the areas served by rail. Jobs and
people are spread throughout modern cities in
a fine-grained pattern. As economist William
Bogart observes, only about 10 to 15 percent of
metropolitan jobs are located in central city
downtowns. In Los Angeles, it’s less than 5 per-
cent. Evenwhen the suburbandowntownareas
are counted—only a small fraction of which
would be served by high-speed rail—the total is
still only 30 to 40 percent.73 That means most
people will rarely, if ever, find high-speed rail to
be convenient.
This is particularly apparent with China’s
Shanghai magnetic levitation (maglev) train,
which travels 19miles between Pudong Airport
and downtown Shanghai. Reaching speeds of
nearly 270 miles per hour, it is the fastest regu-
larly scheduled train in the world. Yet ridership
is well below expectations; rarely are more than
one out of four seats filled. When theNew York
Times asked air travelers why they don’t use the
train, they say it doesn’t go where they want to
go. “Itmay take longer, but the taxi ismore con-
venient,” saysone. “Onceyouget tothetrainsta-
tion, I’d justhave toget a taxi there,” says anoth-
er, “and I don’t want to change cars again.”74
Unlike bus or airline routes, rail is extreme-
ly costly to reroute in response to changing
travel patterns. This has led many rail transit
agencies tobecome land-use czars, demanding
that developers build high-density projects
near their rail stations and discouraging low-
density jobs andhousing elsewhere. Suchpoli-
cies intrude on people’s property rights, make
housing less affordable, and create unfriendly
business environments.75
The January 2008 oversight report from
the California senate committee pointed to a
risky assumption that the California High-
Speed Rail Authority would be able to build
high-speed lines in the rights-of-way owned by
private railroads such as BNSF and Union
Pacific.76 The questionability of this assump-
tion was confirmed by aMay 2008 letter from
the Union Pacific Railroad to the High-Speed
Rail Authority explicitly denying the authority
the right to use any of its right-of-way.
“Union Pacific has carefully evaluated
CHSA’s project,” says the letter, and “does not
feel it is in Union Pacific’s best interest to have
any proposed alignment located on Union
Pacific rights-of-way. Therefore, as your pro-
ject moves forward with its final design, it is
our request that you do so in such a way as to
not require the use of Union Pacific operating
rights-of-way or interfere with Union Pacific
operations.”77
Onereasonwhythe freight railroadsmaynot
wanthigh-speedrail in their rights-of-way is safe-
ty. The California High-Speed Rail Authority
presumed that it would use European-style rail
equipment,which is very lightweight, inorder to
save energy. European and Japanese rail safety is
based on an accident avoidance standard, that is,
everything is very highly engineered to prevent
accidents. This standard has worked well: there
has only been one fatal high-speed rail accident,
which turnedout tobedue topoorly engineered
wheels. However, partly because of the light-
weight equipment, that accident caused the
deaths ofmore than100people.78
In contrast, American safety standards are
basedonaccident survivability.ThismeansAmeri-
can rail equipment ismuchheavier than foreign
high-speed trains. The California senate over-
sight reportworried that thiswouldcreate a reg-
ulatory problem: the Federal Railroad Admini-
stration would refuse to allow the use of the
lightweight trains that the California High-
SpeedRailAuthorityhad inmind.79 Butmixing
American and European trains in the same
rights-of-way, even if not on the same tracks,
would also create a special liability problem for
the railroads, as a derailment of a heavy Ameri-
can train could easily kill many people on an
adjacent lightweight high-speed train. Indeed,
many of the graphics on California’s official
high-speed rail website show high-speed trains
passing just a few feet away from standard
freight and passenger trains.80
Incremental Improvements
vs. Megaprojects
There is an important qualitative differ-
ence between the Midwest rail plan and the
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California and Florida projects. TheMidwest
rail initiative uses off-the-shelf equipment
and can be applied incrementally: one line at
a time; one mile at a time; even one grade
crossing at a time. Every little improvement
will produce some benefit, making rail travel
a little speedier, safer, or more convenient.
In contrast, the California and Florida pro-
posals aremegaprojects. Thismeans, to a large
degree, they canonly bedone as awhole. Itwill
do little good to build a high-speed rail line
halfway from Orlando to Tampa, or from
Stockton to Merced with no connections to
San Jose, San Francisco, or Los Angeles.
Incremental projects and megaprojects
each have their own dangers and pitfalls. The
problems with megaprojects have been well
described by Bent Flyvbjerg and his colleagues
in their book,Megaprojects andRisk.81 Largepro-
jects take years to implement and thus require
long-term forecasting of costs, demand, and
other benefits. The people doing the forecast-
ing too often become advocates for the project
and thus fall prey to optimism bias—the system-
atic tendency to be overly optimistic about the
benefits and costs—and strategic misrepresenta-
tion—thetendency todistortormisstate facts in
order to promote the project.
One example of optimism bias in the
California high-speed rail plan is in the use, or
misuse, of sensitivity analyses. Long-term plans
are necessarily based on many assumptions,
and sensitivity analyses candeterminehowcru-
cial those assumptions are. To do the analysis,
one of the variables is changed and the forecast
is recalculated. A significantly different result is
a signal that the planners need to obtain more
reliable data regarding that variable.
The California High-Speed Rail Authority
conducted a sensitivity analysis for its rider-
ship and revenue forecasts. For the analysis, it
assumed that all of the assumptions it had
made for its forecasts were as cautious as pos-
sible. When it made any of the assumptions
more liberal, the result was naturally an
increase in the forecast ridership and revenues.
The authority never considered the possibility
that any of its assumptions should be made
more conservative, which would have reduced
the ridership and revenue forecasts.82 If, con-
trary to the plan’s assumption, automobiles
become more fuel-efficient—and thus, less
expensive todrive—ridership is likely tobe low-
er than projected.
Many examples of strategic misrepresenta-
tion in the California high-speed rail proposal
have been mentioned above: the emphasis on
the fact that the highway-airport straw-man
alternative described in the EIS costs twice as
much as the rail alternative, while barely men-
tioning that it also produces five times the
benefits; using the “high” ridership projec-
tions in the energy analysis; and the assump-
tion that future cars and planes will be no
more energy-efficient than they are today.
Denver’s “FasTracks” rail plan illustrates
the dangers of megaprojects. This plan called
for connecting Denver to its suburbs with six
new rail lines. Suburban officials worried that,
if the rail lines were built sequentially, cost
overruns would delay or make impossible the
completion of every line. So that no suburb
would have to go without its rail connection,
they insisted that the lines all be built simulta-
neously. To gain popular support, the transit
agency promised it could build the project on
time and on budget.
The project was approved in 2004 at a pro-
jected cost of $4.7 billion. Since then, the esti-
mated cost has risen by 68 percent to $7.9 bil-
lion. The sales taxes that were supposed to pay
for theproject arenowprojected to fall shortof
expectations by $2.8 billion.83 Instead of com-
pleting all the rail lines by 2017, as promised,
the regional transit district now says comple-
tionmay be delayed until 2034.84 In themean-
time, important but low-cost transportation
improvements, such as traffic signal coordina-
tion, gounfundedbecausemostof the region’s
transportation funds are tied up in a project
that will not see a single wheel turn for many
years, if ever.
The problems associated with incremental
projects are subtler but no less real. Although
total costs may be high, the incremental costs
are low, so government agencies can spend
money with little public scrutiny. The major
document describing the Midwest program,
15
Megaproject
planners too
often fall prey
to optimism bias,
where they
delude them-
selves, and
strategic misrep-
resentation,
where they
delude the public,
about the
benefits and costs
of the project.
357436_PA625_1stClass:357436_PA625_1stClass  10/24/2008  9:48 AM  Page 15
Midwest Regional Rail System: Executive Report,
does not even bother to describe any benefits
of rail.85 The website of the Midwest High
Speed Rail Association claims that rail is effi-
cient and clean, but offers little evidence that
this is true.86 Considering that the detailed
analysis for the Florida project found that the
opposite is true, there is little reason to take
such statements on faith.
In contrast to Denver’s 120-mile FasTracks
plan, Seattle’s Link light rail might be consid-
ered an incremental plan. When it was ap-
provedbyvoters in1996, the21-mileprojectwas
supposedtocost$1.7billion.87By2001, thepro-
jecthadshrunkto14mileswithaprojectedcost
of $2.1 billion.88 By 2007, the uncompleted pro-
ject was estimated to cost $2.4 billion, meaning
the cost permile hadmore than doubled.89
At first glance, the way to prevent over-
spending on either megaprojects or incre-
mental projects is to require rigorous analy-
ses and testing of claimed benefits and
projected costs. Performance standards ques-
tions that might be asked include
• Are the proposed rail lines cost-effective at
moving people, relative to other trans-
portation investments? This paper sug-
gests that the three projects discussed
above are not. While dollar of capital
investment per annual passenger mile is a
crude measure of cost-effectiveness, it is
easily calculated with available data. Rural
freeway lanescost$0.68perannualpassen-
ger mile, while Midwest rail costs $1.85,
California high-speed rail costs $2.30, and
Tampa-Orlando rail costs $5.40 per annu-
al passengermile.
• Are the proposed rail lines cost-effective
at saving people’s time, relative to other
investments? Since rail lines are poten-
tially faster thanhighways, the time saved
may be worth the added cost per annual
passengermile. But then the comparison
needs to be made with flying, and it is
possible that alternatives, such as stream-
lined airport security systems, could save
as much time for far less money.
• Are the proposed rail lines cost-effective
at saving energy, reducing air pollution,
and achieving other environmental and
social goals? The EIS for the Florida
project frankly admits that it is not,
while the California project produces
relatively insignificant environmental
benefits at a very high cost.
The problem with the performance-stan-
dards approach is that the political momen-
tum behind multi-billion-dollar projects is
often enough to override even an accurate
analysis that shows that the costs will exceed
the benefits. The real beneficiaries in such
projects are not the people whowill eventual-
ly ride the trains, but the companies that will
design and build them. These companies are
obviously willing to spend hundreds of thou-
sands of dollars in order to earn the tens of
millions of dollars in profits that are likely to
be involved in such projects.
For example, when Denver’s FasTracks rail
plan was on the ballot in 2004, Siemens
Transportation, which makes light-rail cars,
contributed more than $100,000 to the elec-
tion campaign. It also contributed money to
the campaigns of transit agency board mem-
bers and other elected officials who supported
rail construction.90 In return, Denver’s transit
board gave Siemens a $187-million, no-bid
contract for light-rail cars, one of the largest
contracts for light-rail equipment ever.91
This political momentum becomes even
stronger after the first rail lines are built. No
matter how poorly those lines perform, the
consultants that designed them and the con-
tractors that built them have a powerful
incentive to promote more lines in order to
keep the tax dollars flowing. Rail construc-
tion becomes an end in itself, nomatter what
the cost to taxpayers and nomatter how neg-
ligible the benefits to users.
The Ultimate Performance
Standard
The only way to make sure that the bene-
fits of high-speed rail and other transporta-
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tion projects exceed the costs is to build them
without tax subsidies. If private parties are
not willing to put up their own money to
build such facilities with the expectation of
earning a profit, why should the public sur-
render their tax dollars with the expectation
of earning a loss?
One oft-given answer is that rail is more
environmentally friendly than autos andhigh-
ways. But this is not supported by the facts.
Not only does rail use as much energy and
emit asmuch ofmost pollutants as autos, it is
extremely land intensive. Forget about claims
that one rail line can move as many people as
an eight-lane freeway. In actual practice, very
few rail lines come close to moving as many
people as even one freeway lane. If moving the
maximum number of people is the goal, an
exclusive bus lane packed with 10 to 20 buses
per minute can move far more people than
just about any rail line.
Another answer is that the United States
has subsidized highways for many years, so
rail needs subsidies to catch up. But subsidies
to highways have actually been very minor—
around one-half to one penny per passenger
mile.92 By comparison, subsidies to Amtrak
are around 22 cents per passenger mile and
subsidies to public transit are around 61
cents per passenger mile.93
When considering megaprojects like high-
speed rail, it is useful to consider the experi-
ence of one megaproject that was successful:
the Interstate Highway System. Interstate
highwaysmake up only 2 percent of rural lane
miles and less than 4 percent of urban lane
miles, yet they carry 25 percent of both rural
andurban auto travel.94 Because they are some
of the safest roads in America, and they attract
traffic away from other roads, they have great-
ly contributed to the 70 percent reduction in
highway fatality rates, per billion vehiclemiles,
since 1960.95
The key to the success of the Interstate
Highway System is that it was built entirely
from user fees, mainly federal and state gaso-
line taxes. Gas taxes are not themost efficient
user fee, but like all user fees they impose a
discipline on thosewho collect and spend the
money: if they fail to build facilities that peo-
ple will use, they will receive little or no user
fees. In contrast, when transportation facili-
ties are funded out of tax dollars, the taxes
keep rolling in no matter how much the
money is wasted.
Funding transportation out of user fees
thus becomes themost effective possible per-
formance standard. Direct user fees, such as
tolls and transit fares, are more effective than
indirect fees, such as gas taxes. But any user
fees at all are more effective than general tax-
es, which merely encourage pork-barreling
and wasteful spending.
If any high-speed rail lines can meet the
user-fee test in the United States, they will
certainly make an interesting and useful con-
tribution to the nation’s transportation sys-
tem. But taxpayers should not be asked to bet
billions of dollars that high-speed rail will
become anything more than heavily subsi-
dized operations that are used by a small
minority of people at everyone else’s expense.
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